In two studies, we explored 5-year-olds' and adults' beliefs about entities that receive reference by proper names. In Study 1 we used two tasks: (1) a listing task in which participants stated what things in the world can and cannot receive proper names, and (2) an explanation task in which they explained why some things merit proper names. Children's lists of proper namable things were more centred than adults' on living animate entities and their surrogates (e.g., dolls and stuffed animals). Both children's and adults' lists of non-namable things contained a predominance of artefacts. Both age groups offered similar explanations for proper namability, the most common of which pertained to the desire or need to identify objects as individuals (or to distinguish them from other objects). In Study 2 we replicated the main results of the Study 1 listing task, using a modified set of instructions. The findings establish a set of norms about the scope and coherence of children's and adults' concept of a proper namable entity, and they place constraints on an account of how children learn proper names (Macnamara, 1982 (Macnamara, , 1986 . FIRST LANGUAGE ARTICLE People expect that any individual encountered in the world could be called by a count noun (i.e., a word that names an object category, such as 'dog' or 'shoe'), but that only some of them could also be labelled by a proper name (i.e., a word that names an individual object, such as 'Fred' or 'Fido'). In this research, we asked two questions: (a) What kinds of things do children and adults believe could be referred to by proper names? (b) What makes these kinds deserve reference by proper names?
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in speech? In an influential book, Macnamara (1982) proposed that children rely on the assumption that proper names are the words that people use to pick out objects belonging to kinds of things whose members are seen as enduringly significant in their own right. According to Macnamara (1982: 30) [b]y the time the child comes to learn language, he has already learned that objects in certain categories are important as individuals, those in other categories are merely exemplars of the category. Person is the preeminent category of the first sort, and when he is introduced to one, he will take the word applied to that person as a proper name. Words applied to objects in most other categories he will take as [count nouns].
Elsewhere, Macnamara (1986: 81) elaborated on his list of things that children should see as important in their own right, mentioning 'family pets, dolls, and perhaps stuffed animals'. Macnamara's list contained only people, animals and their surrogates, because 'in the child's world, the objects that have proper names are all living or surrogates for living objects, like dolls and Yogi the bear'. Thus, children's beliefs about what can receive a proper name stem from an understanding that only some things in the world are of lasting importance as individuals, and the fact that these beliefs pertain to people, animals and their surrogates merely reflects the limits of children's experience with other kinds of things.
According to Macnamara (1982 Macnamara ( , 1986 , children also see many things as not meriting reference by a proper name. These include items that children do not take to be of enduring significance as individuals, simple artefact objects such as plates, spoons, shoes and toy blocks. They also include other kinds of artefacts (e.g., cars, boats) and human constructions (e.g., streets, towns) that, at least for adults, are often seen as significant as individuals and, thus, deserving of proper names. According to Macnamara (1982) , these items satisfy the criterion of being of lasting importance as individuals in their own right (at least to adults), but they are things for which children have not experienced proper names or which are simply unfamiliar to children: 'Young children seem to have little notion of what is meant by a town or a street . . ., and they do not often refer to their home or the family car by a proper name ' (p. 19) .
Several studies of word learning in childhood have obtained evidence consistent with Macnamara's proposal that children believe that only people, animals and their surrogates are suitable candidates for receiving proper names. These studies have documented that young children will readily interpret a novel word, modelled syntactically as a proper name, as a name for an individual object if the object is a stand-in for an animate living thing, such as a doll (Hall et al., 2001; Katz et al., 1974) , a human-like creature (Gelman & Taylor, 1984; Jaswal & Markman, 2001; Liittschwager & Markman, 1993) , or any of a number of different kinds of animal, including a bear, a bird, a cat, a dog, a dolphin-like creature, a monkey, a mosquito-like creature, a penguin, a rabbit, a seal-like creature or a squirrel-like creature (Hall, 1991 (Hall, , 1994 (Hall, , 1996 Hall & Graham, 1999; Hall et al., 2001; Imai & Haryu, 2001; Jaswal & Markman, 2001; Liittschwager & Markman, 1993; Sorrentino, 2001) . If the animal is described as a pet, children will also make a proper name interpretation if the word is applied to a snail, a bee, a caterpillar or a spider (Hall, 1994) . In contrast, a number of studies have found that children are less likely to interpret the same word as being a proper name for an individual object if the object is an artefact, such as a baby bottle, a ball, a balloon, a block, a boat, a car, a cup, a hat, a honey dipper, a kaleidoscope, a plastic block-like toy, a plastic plumbing T, a ship, a shoe, a spoon, a shuttlecock, a suction cup, a train, a vegetable peeler or a wand (Gelman & Taylor, 1984; Hall, 1994; Imai & Haryu, 2001; Jaswal & Markman, 2001; Katz et al., 1974; Liittschwager & Markman, 1993) .
The preceding findings are consistent with Macnamara's (1982 Macnamara's ( , 1986 proposal, but they do not provide a clear test of it for at least two reasons. First, previous studies have examined relatively few items, making it difficult to use the findings to infer the scope or coherence of children's beliefs about what things merit reference by a proper name. In addition, the items used in previous studies have been selected by the experimenters as being plausible examples of things that deserve or do not deserve proper names. Thus, the findings may be a better reflection of the structure of adults' than children's concept of what things are proper namable. Moreover, some recent results indicate that children will attribute a proper name to certain items that would not be expected to be namable under Macnamara's proposal. For example, Sorrentino (2002) showed that preschoolers will sometimes learn a proper name for an artefact object, if the experimenter first describes its physical properties and/or attributes mental states to it. In contrast, Hall (1991) and Imai & Haryu (2001) showed that preschoolers will often fail to make a proper name interpretation of a word for an animate toy object, if the object category is unfamiliar. These findings raise further questions about the proposed scope of children's concept of what entities deserve a proper name.
A second limitation of previous research is that it sheds little light on the basis for children's attribution of proper names to things. On the assumption that children's beliefs about what things can receive proper names relate to their success at identifying these expressions in speech (Macnamara, 1982) , it is vital to understand children's underlying reasons for attributing proper names. It is possible, as Macnamara (1982) hypothesized, that children believe that proper namable things are those entities in their experience that they view as important as individuals in their own right. But the previous findings are also consistent with other possibilities. For example, perhaps children attribute proper names on the basis of whether something has the feature of an animate living thing, such as particular morphological features or the ability to move, or whether something is seen to possess mental states.
We designed the current study to meet the two preceding goals: to establish norms about the structure and coherence of children's concept of a proper namable thing, and to constrain an account of how children learn to identify proper names in speech. Our approach involved engaging 5-year-olds in two tasks. In one task, we asked them directly to generate lists of all the kinds of things they could think of that both could and could not receive a proper name. We used these lists to infer the scope and coherence of their concept of proper namable thing. If Macnamara (1982 Macnamara ( , 1986 ) is correct, then children's lists of namable things should be heavily weighted with living animates and their surrogates, and their lists of non-namable things should contain mostly artefacts. In the other task, we asked children directly to explain why they believed certain things could receive proper names, in an attempt to shed light on the explicit rationale that children use to justify attributing proper names to things. Again, if Macnamara (1982 Macnamara ( , 1986 is right, then children should commonly explain their willingness to ascribe proper names to things on the basis of the need for an object to be treated as an individual in its own right (e.g., to be identified on its own or discriminated from other individuals). Of course, by focusing on 5-year-olds, we studied children who were past the point of acquiring their first names (e.g., Hall et al., 2001; Macnamara, 1982 ). Yet 5-year-olds are still actively learning the vocabulary of their native language (Anglin, 1993) . Moreover, they are old enough to generate lists of namable and nonnamable things, as well as to provide explanations about proper namability. Thus, through a careful examination of 5-year-olds' beliefs about proper names, we expected to place constraints on an account of how children learn to identify these expressions in speech, opening the way for further investigation with younger and/or older children.
Our study also included a group of adults, who took part in the same tasks as 5-year-olds. Our rationale for including adults was to document the end-state of development in beliefs about proper namability. Macnamara's (1982 Macnamara's ( , 1986 proposal, applied to adults, yields the following predictions. First, because adults have heard proper names for a wide range of things and are familiar with many kinds of things (and because, in principle, any individual is potentially the bearer of a proper name), their lists of proper namable things should be broader than those of children. For example, we anticipated that these lists would include, in addition to animals and their surrogates, many other kinds of individuals, such as artefacts (cars, computers), companies (restaurants, stores), events (hurricanes), institutions (schools, churches), media products (books, movies) and places (cities, rivers). We did not expect to find these items on children's lists, because children either had not encountered names for them before or were simply unfamiliar with these kinds of things. Although there have been attempts by linguists and psychologists to catalogue the kinds of things to which people attribute proper names (e.g., Valentine, Brennan & Brédart, 1996) , we know of no previous systematic empirical analysis of adults' beliefs about what kinds of things can be labelled with a proper name. Second, adults' explanations for why things could receive proper names, like those of children, should focus on the need to pick the objects out as individuals in their own right (e.g., to be identified on their own or distinguished from others). In other words, we predicted that both adults and children would claim that proper names serve to pick out those things that are important as individuals in their own right, despite the fact that they would mention different things on their lists of what things merit proper names.
STUDY 1

METHOD
Participants
There were 30 participants, 15 5-year-olds (5;1-6;3, M = 5;7) and 15 adults (18-22, M = 20 years). The children were tested individually in their daycare centres or nursery schools during regular school hours. Adults were psychology undergraduates who volunteered to take part. They were tested in small groups (of up to four) in a laboratory testing room of a university psychology department and received course credit for participating. An additional seven children were tested but excluded from the final sample: five for failing to complete the task (see below), one for failing to follow instructions, and one for failing to co-operate with the experimenter. One additional adult was tested but excluded from the final sample for failing to follow instructions.
Materials and procedure
Listing task
We asked participants to generate lists of proper namable and non-namable things. Participants first generated a list of namable things. Children and adults received similar instructions. To children, the experimenter said: 'I'm going to ask you to tell me everything you think people could have a proper name for. Adults' instructions were identical to children's, except that adults were asked to write their answers on a blank sheet of lined paper. We told adults not to worry about matching the number of their answers to the number of spaces on the page and simply to write down whatever they thought. Unlike children, adults received no prompts.
After they generated their list of namable things, we asked all participants to create a list of non-namable things. The instructions were similar to those given for the namable lists, except that the request to list things that we 'could give a proper name to' was replaced by a request for things we 'could not give a proper name to'.
Explanation task
After they completed the listing task, we asked participants to generate explanations for why people could give something a proper name. Children and adults again received similar instructions. To children, the experimenter said: 'Why do you think some things could have a proper name? Please tell me what you think.' We encouraged children to provide as thorough an answer as possible. We audio-taped children's responses for transcription. Adults' instructions were identical to children's, except that adults were asked to write their answers on a blank sheet of lined paper.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Listing task
Overview and coding
Adults and children readily engaged in the task and generated answers to the two questions. When asked to list namable things, the 15 adults provided a total of 430 tokens (M = 28.7, SD = 15.4) belonging to 237 different types; their lists of non-namable things contained 333 tokens (M = 22.2, SD = 15.5) from 240 different types. The difference between the mean number of namable and nonnamable tokens generated by adults was not significant, by paired t test.
Children's lists of namable things contained a total of 144 tokens (M = 9.6, SD = 5.0) from 99 different types; their lists of non-namable things included 147 tokens (M = 9.8, SD = 4.6) belonging to 109 different types. As with adults, there was no significant difference between the mean number of namable and non-namable tokens listed by children, by paired t test.
Comparisons between the mean numbers of tokens on adults' and children's lists, however, revealed significant differences. Adults provided significantly more namable (t (28) = 4.57, p < 0.0001) and non-namable (t (28) = 2.98, p = 0.006) tokens than children did.
To conduct further analyses, we reduced the list generated by all adults combined to include only those types mentioned by two or more adults; and we reduced the list generated by all children combined to include only those types mentioned by two or more children. We did this in an attempt to increase the likelihood that our lists reflected (at least reasonably) common beliefs about namable and non-namable things. For adults, the result of this data reduction was a list containing 72 namable thing types and another list containing 45 non-namable thing types. For children, the lists contained 24 and 20 types, respectively.
For the purposes of further analysis, we then divided the items on each of the four lists (adults' and children's namable and non-namable things) into three mutually-exclusive categories: (1) living animate things and their surrogates; (2) artefacts; and (3) other things (e.g., companies, events, institutions, media products, places). The artefact category included manufactured objects and their parts, but it excluded certain items like restaurants, stores and schools, which do pick out physical objects but whose names may refer to a company (e.g., McDonald's, Walmart) or an institution (e.g., Harvard University). The artefact category also excluded the item 'books,' which is used to pick out physical objects but which may refer to an abstract creative work (e.g., The Great Gatsby). These items were all assigned to category (3) (other things). The resulting lists appear in Tables 1-4 . The number of group members mentioning each item is given in parenthesis after the item.
Namable things lists
If Macnamara (1982 Macnamara ( , 1986 ) is correct, then children's lists of namable things should contain mostly living animate things and their surrogates. In contrast, adults' lists of proper namable things should contain not only items that are living animate things and their surrogates but also artefacts and many other things, reflecting the broad range of items that typically receive proper names in the adult language (e.g., Valentine et al., 1996) .
The data are given in Tables 1 and 2 . We tested our predictions in two ways. First, we examined the percentages of items on adults' and children's lists that fell into the categories of (1) living animate things and their surrogates, (2) artefacts, and (3) other things. As predicted, the children's list of namable things was heavily weighted with living animate things and their surrogates. They accounted for 75% (18/24) of the items on the list. Artefacts made up only 17% (4/24), and other things accounted for the remaining 8% (2/24). In
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houses (2), toys (2), schools (2) rabbits (3), stuffed animals (3), tractors (2) birds (2), cheetahs (2), dolls (2), ducks (2), frogs (2), horses (2), neighbours (2), puppets (2), puppies (2) Note No. subjects responding is given in parenthesis. Bold items were common to children's and adults' namable things lists.
contrast, the adults' list was not centred heavily on living animate things and their stand-ins, containing only 21% living things and their surrogates (15/72). Instead, the adults' list contained a sizeable percentage of items from the other categories: 22% artefacts (16/72) and 57% other things (41/72). Consistent with our predictions, children's and adults' lists of namable things were structured very differently, with children's list being dominated by living animate objects and their surrogates and adults' list containing a much wider range of items.
Second, we focused on the number of different participants in each age group who contributed at least one item to each of the three categories on the list. The results were consistent with the preceding findings. We found that 14/15 children and 13/15 adults contributed to the category of living animate things and their surrogates. This difference was not significant, by χ 2 test. In contrast, only 4/15 children but 13/15 adults contributed to the category of artefacts, a significant difference, χ 2 (1, N = 30) = 11.00, p = 0.0009. The same difference obtained for the category of other things: only 4/15 children (7), cars (12), buildings (9), cities (9), streets (8), animals (6), cats (6) , toys (6) , boats (5), countries (7), companies (6), pets (6) , cows (4) , airplanes (4), houses (4), oceans (6), rivers (6), lakes (5), fish (4), birds (3), pigs
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clothes (3), appliances (2), mountains (5), songs (5), trees (5), (3), dolls(2), goats (2), boots (2), cameras (2), TV programmes (5), books (4), horses (2), imaginary chairs (2), computers (2), parks (4), plants (4), schools (4), friends (2), stuffed pens (2), shoes (2), tables games (3), movies (3), planets (3), animals (2), TV (2), watches (2) provinces (3), religions (3), characters (2) restaurants (3), stars (3), towns (3), avenues (2), chemical products (2), diseases (2), drinks (2), flowers (2), food (2), fruits (2), hurricanes (2), languages (2), organizations (2), places (2), poems (2), political parties (2), roads (2), rooms (2), sports teams (2), stores (2), subjects of learning (2) supplied items for the category, whereas 15/15 adults did so, another significant difference, χ 2 (1, N = 30) = 17.37, p < 0.0001. These results were thus consistent with the preceding finding that children's list of namable things was more centred than adults' list on animate living things and their surrogates. Three additional facts about children's and adults' lists deserve comment. First, the items mentioned on the lists were predominantly basic-level count nouns (Rosch, Mervis, Johnson, Grey & Boyes-Braem, 1976) , although participants were not directed to offer only these words. For example, when we focused on two categories (living animate things and their surrogates, and artefacts), we found that children's list of namable things contained only two superordinate-level count nouns (animals, toys), and adults' list included not many more (animals, appliances, clothes, toys). This finding points to the primacy of the basic level in the way both children and adults construe objects in the world. Second, the living animate things listed by both groups were predominantly toys, pets, or other domesticated animals. This fact suggests that the list is composed not just of any living animate things, but more precisely of those living animate objects that are important to people. Finally, over half the items (58% or 14/24) on children's namable things list also appeared on adults' list. These items are emboldened in Tables 1 and 2 . They included 10 animates and animate surrogates, two artefacts and two other things. This result points to some degree of continuity between children and adults, although the overall scope of the lists of namable things was strikingly different.
Non-namable things lists
If Macnamara's (1982 Macnamara's ( , 1986 proposal is right, children's list of non-namable things should be heavily weighted with artefacts. In contrast, adults' list of non-namable things should, like their list of namable things, contain a wider range of items, reflecting the fact that there are many kinds of living animate things, artefacts and other things to which adults normally do not ascribe proper names.
14 FIRST LANGUAGE VOLUME 24 ISSUE 1 (6) , walls (5), houses (4), tables (4), trees (4) doors (3), glasses (3), lights (3), shoes (3), windows (3), beds (2) , chairs (2), cupboards (2), curtains (2), heaters (2), pencils (2) , shelves (2), shirts (2), toilets (2), toys (2) The data appear in Tables 3 and 4 . As predicted, children's list of nonnamable things was dominated by artefacts. The list contained no living animates or their surrogates. Instead, it contained 95% artefacts (19/20) and 5% other items (1/20) . A somewhat unexpected result was that adults' list of non-namable things was structured very similarly to children's. The list also contained no living animates or their surrogates (0/45). Instead, it too contained a mix of artefacts (84% or 38/45) and other items (16% or 7/45), similar to that of children. Thus, consistent with our prediction, children's list of non-namable things was dominated by artefacts, as was that of adults.
As with the namable things lists, we conducted our next analyses using as our dependent measure the number of different participants in each age group who contributed at least one item to each of the three categories. The results revealed a pattern consistent with our previous findings: 0/15 children and 0/15 adults contributed to the category of living animates and their surrogates, and so we computed no statistic. In contrast, we found that 14/15 children and 15/15 adults contributed to the category of artefacts, a nonsignificant difference by χ 2 test. Finally, we noted that only 4/15 children supplied items for the other things category, whereas 11/15 adults did so, a significant difference, χ 2 (1, N = 30) = 6.53, p < 0.05. The results are in keeping with our previous finding that both children's and adults' lists were heavily weighted with artefacts and, to a lesser degree, other items. (7), paper (7), chairs (6) ,
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food (5), body parts (3), carpets (5), houses (5) , tables (5), colours (2), emotions (2), walls (5) , floors (4), furniture (4), sky (2), trees (2), pencils (4), pens (4), brushes (3), water (2) ceilings (3), curtains (3), doors (3), glasses (3), jewellery (3), lamps (3), shoes (3), socks (3), TVs (3), windows (3), appliances (2), beds (2), cutlery (2), fabric (2), light bulbs (2), mirrors (2), nails (2), radios (2), roofs (2), shelves (2), sprinklers (2), toilets (2), toilet paper (2), toothbrushes (2), VCRs (2), writing implements (2) Two other features of children's and adults' non-namable lists merit comment. First, children's and adults' lists contained mostly basic-level count nouns (Rosch et al., 1976) . The children's list contained no superordinate-level count nouns, and the adults' list included only a few superordinates (appliances, clothing, cutlery, furniture, jewellery, writing implements). Again, this finding suggests the centrality of the basic level in children's and adults' construal of things in the world. Second, there was overlap between children's and adults' lists of non-namable things, as there was in the case of their lists of namable things. Over three-quarters of the items (80% or 16/20) in the children's non-namable list also turned up in the adults' list. These items, printed in bold in Tables 3 and 4 , included 15 artefacts and one other thing. This result indicates similarity between children and adults in terms of their beliefs about what kinds of things do not merit proper names.
Comparisons between namable and non-namable things lists
For both children and adults, lists of namable and non-namable things were, in large part, non-overlapping. This result signals that both groups distinguished clearly between namable and non-namable things. However, several items did appear on both adults' lists or both children's lists. This finding requires some explanation, because it suggests that adults and children failed, to some degree, to draw a clear distinction between namable and non-namable things. How could the same item crop up on both a namable and a non-namable list?
We first considered adults' lists of namable and non-namable things. We found five artefacts (chairs, houses, pens, shoes, tables) and two other things (food, trees) that appeared on both lists. No individual adult had the same item on both his/her namable list and also his/her non-namable list. Thus, the appearance of these items on both namable and non-namable lists reflected differences between adults in terms of how they construed the items. We can think of at least two reasons why these particular items might have turned up on both lists. First, some adults may have listed certain items as proper namable because they do receive an associated brand name (e.g., 'Bic' pens; 'Nike' shoes; various brands of food; various furniture brands, such as chairs named ' Albert', and tables called 'Manfred' sold at Ikea, a popular furniture store), whereas other adults may have listed the same items as non-namable because they do not receive a personal name (e.g., we do not usually speak of 'Peter' the pen or 'Sam' the shoe). Second, for other items, adults may have been thinking about a personal name, but simply disagreed over whether the item merited one. For example, they may have had differing opinions about whether it is appropriate to give proper names to houses or trees. In some parts of the world, but not others, it is common to give a house a personal name (e.g., 'Tara' in Gone with the Wind); in addition, some trees, but not all, receive personal names (e.g., 'General Sherman,' a giant sequoia in Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Park).
Only two items, both from the other things category (houses, toys), were common to children's lists of namable and non-namable things. We have already offered a possible explanation for this fact for the item 'house'. For the item 'toy' it is possible that some children mentioned it as non-namable because they believed it was unworthy of a personal name, whereas others listed it as namable because they were thinking of a particular brand name. It is also possible that some children had an inanimate toy in mind, like a block, when they said a toy was non-namable, whereas others were thinking of an animate surrogate, like a stuffed animal, when they listed a toy as namable.
Summary of listing task
Consistent with the claim of Macnamara (1982 Macnamara ( , 1986 , children tended to list animate living things and their surrogates as meriting a proper name, and tended not to mention human artefacts or other things (like places, buildings, events, media products) as being so deserving. In contrast, adults tended to judge all the preceding types of things to be worthy of receiving a proper name. Children and adults showed similar beliefs about what things are nonnamable. Both age groups tended to list human artefacts and other things as being unworthy of a proper name, and neither group mentioned a single living animate or surrogate as being an unsuitable recipient of a proper name.
The preceding results indicate that the primary difference between children and adults was in the lists of proper namable things, with children's list showing a more exclusive focus on living animates and their surrogates than adults'. It remains unclear, however, what accounts for this difference. As discussed earlier, the difference might reflect the fact that both groups have similar beliefs about why some things are namable (e.g., they are important as individuals), but children have not yet been sufficiently exposed to names for anything but living animates and their surrogates or are simply unfamiliar with the full range of namable things that appear on adults' lists (Macnamara, 1982) . On the other hand, the two groups might have different understandings of why some things receive names. For adults, this notion might be based on whether something is seen to be important as an individual, but for children the concept might be based on whether things are living animates or have the properties of living animates (e.g., a characteristic animate form, the presence of a face or eyes, the possession of mental states). The data from the listing task do not address this issue, and so we now turn to the data from the explanation task to address why participants listed certain things as being namable.
Explanation task
Overview and coding
Adults and children readily generated explanations for why some things could get proper names. Recall that all participants were asked for as many explanations as they could give. Adults generated a total of 36 explanations for why some things could receive a proper name (M = 2.4, SD = 0.9). Children provided a total of 29 explanations for why some things could receive a proper name (M = 1.9, SD = 0.9). Although children provided fewer explanations, on average, than adults, there was no significant difference between the mean number of explanations provided by adults and by children.
One of the experimenters coded each explanation generated by adults and children as falling into one of seven categories, according to its content. After one of the authors coded all the explanations, a second coder independently coded the explanations using the same categories. Intercoder agreement, calculated using Cohen's kappa, was an acceptable 0.85. All disagreements were subsequently resolved through discussion. The seven categories of reasons were the following:
1. Identification or discrimination Because they need to be singled out from others as individuals in their own right.
Social interaction or affection
Because of a need to engage socially with them or to signal feeling for them.
3. Beauty or value Because they are important, honourable, beautiful or valuable.
4. Life Because they are alive, or because they have features associated with living things (e.g., a particular form, a face, eyes, the ability to move, the possession of mental states).
5. Ownership Because they are possessed by someone.
6. Concreteness Because they are concrete.
7.
Other This category included references to the kind of object (e.g., because it's an X), references to a basic need for a name (e.g., because it needs a name), as well as idiosyncratic explanations.
The Appendix provides specific examples provided by children and adults of explanations falling into each of the seven categories. See Table 5 for the results of the coding.
Explanations
Children's and adults' explanations were similar, despite the difference in the structure of their lists of what things can receive proper names. Consider first the children's explanations. Only two categories of explanation were used by half or more of the children. The most commonly used explanation category was (1) identification or discrimination. This category was used by 80% of the children (12/15). The only other category used by half or more of the children was (2) social interaction or affection: 53% of children (8/15) used it. Children rarely relied on any other explanation categories, although several children (6/15 or 40%) contributed explanations that fell into category 7 (other). Adults' explanations were very similar to children's. As with the children, only two categories were used by at least half the adults, and they were the same two categories most popular with children: category 1, used by 87% of the adults (13/15), and category 2 used by 60% of the adults (9/15). No other category was used by more than one-third of the adults.
We compared the numbers of children and adults who used each of our coding categories, using χ 2 tests. None of these analyses was significant, indicating that similar numbers of children and adults used each of the seven categories to explain why things receive proper names.
Consistent with Macnamara's (1982 Macnamara's ( , 1986 proposal, the majority of children and adults explained that certain things received proper names in order to be identified on their own or to be distinguished from other things. Both groups also less commonly offered other types of explanations for why some things receive proper names, notably those pertaining to interacting socially with them or marking affection for them. Explanations involving reference to being alive or to having properties of living things (including human properties) were relatively rare in both groups. This finding suggests that the preponderance of living animates and their surrogates on children's list of namable things does not reflect the belief that proper names are bestowed on things because they are alive or have living (or human) properties per se. Instead, the findings suggest that the difference in the composition of adults' and children's lists of namable things reflects the limited experience of young children, such as their restricted exposure to names for things that adults give names to, or their unfamiliarity with the kinds of things themselves.
Summary of explanation task
In line with Macnamara's (1982 Macnamara's ( , 1986 claim, most children explained why certain things can receive proper names by alluding to the need to identify the referent on its own or to distinguish it from other things. Such explanations suggest that children hold the belief that things receive proper names to mark them as important as individuals in their own right. A smaller number of (6) 13 (2) * N = 15 per age group.
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children, but still more than half, mentioned the need to interact socially with something or to mark affect for something as a reason for giving it a proper name. No other category of explanation was provided in large numbers by children. Strikingly, adults' explanations for why things can receive proper names also centred on the same two types of reasons, with few explanations from any other category being provided.
A question arising from the results
A review of the results of Study 1 revealed one finding that called for further examination. Many adults (10/15) but no children (0/15) included 'people' on their lists. Given that 'people' would seem to be prototypical namable things, what can explain this striking difference? One possibility is that children simply see people as inherently less namable than adults do. Another possibility is that both children and adults view people as namable, and the observed difference stems from methodology. Specifically, recall that we used 'people' as our standard example of a proper namable thing for all participants. Yet only children's task was administered orally, and so only children received prompts that explicitly reminded them of this standard. These prompts may have tended to keep children from repeating the standard. Adults may have been more likely to include it on their lists because they received no prompting and either lost track of it or simply decided to repeat it during the generation of their sometimes-lengthy lists. Thus the use of the standard 'people,' along with the use of explicit prompts for children, may have led to the appearance of 'people' in the adults' but not in the children's list of namable things. In order to address this matter, in Study 2 we replicated the listing task of Study 1, modifying the procedure in two ways. First, we changed the standard from 'people' to another prototypically namable thing, 'dogs'. Second, we changed children's negative prompts so that they did not include a reminder about the standard. If the difference observed in Study 1 reflected a difference in the tendency to see people as namable, then we expected to replicate the differential mentioning of 'people' from Study 1. But if the observed difference stemmed from the method used in Study 1, then we expected (1) that children and adults would now mention 'people', and (2) that neither group would prohibit the inclusion of the new standard 'dogs' on their lists.
STUDY 2 METHOD
Participants
There were 30 participants, 15 5-year-olds (5;0-5;11, M = 5;6) and 15 adults (19-31, M = 20 years). Children were tested individually in a laboratory testing room of a university psychology department. They were recruited through a database of volunteer families maintained by the laboratory. Children received a small gift for participating, and parents were reimbursed for travel/parking. Adults were tested as in Study 1. No participants had taken part in Study 1. No children or adults were excluded from the analysis.
Materials and procedure
This was the same as the listing task used in Study 1, with two exceptions. First, in asking participants to generate a list of namable and non-namable things, we used 'dogs' rather than 'people' as our standard example of a proper namable thing. We said, ' A proper name is a word like Rover [point to drawing of one dog] and Ralph [point to drawing of another dog]. So a dog is something we can have a proper name for. Now it's your turn. I don't want you to tell me more names like Rover and Ralph. I want you to tell me what other things besides dogs we could give a proper name to.' Second, the negative prompt did not include a reminder of the standard, 'dogs'.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Listing task
Overview and coding
Adults and children again easily understood the task and provided answers to the two questions. When asked to list namable things, the 15 adults provided a total of 326 tokens (M = 21.7, SD = 8.3) belonging to 154 different types; their lists of non-namable things contained 269 tokens (M = 20.8, SD = 14.0) from 169 different types. As in Study 1, the difference between the mean number of namable and non-namable tokens generated by adults was not significant, by paired t test.
Children's lists of namable things contained a total of 169 tokens (M = 11. 1, SD = 4.3) from 81 different types; their lists of non-namable things included 164 tokens (M = 10.9, SD = 5.8) belonging to 117 different types. As in Study 1, there was no significant difference between the mean number of namable and non-namable tokens listed by children, by paired t test.
Comparisons between the mean numbers of tokens on adults' and children's lists again uncovered significant differences. Adults provided significantly more namable (t (28) = 4.37, p = 0.0002) and non-namable (t (28) = 2.53, p = 0.02) tokens than children did.
As in Study 1, we reduced adults' combined list to include only those types mentioned by two or more adults, and children's combined list to include only those types mentioned by two or more children. For adults the result of this data reduction was a list containing 59 namable thing types and another list containing 60 non-namable thing types. For children we ended up with a list of 35 namable thing types and another list of 33 non-namable thing types.
In order to conduct further analyses, we divided the items on each of the four lists (adults' and children's namable and non-namable things) into three mutually-exclusive categories, exactly as in Study 1: (1) living animate things and their surrogates, (2) artefacts, and (3) other things (e.g., companies, events, institutions, media products, places). These lists appear in Tables 6-9. The number of group members mentioning each item is again given in parenthesis after the item.
Namable things list
As in Study 1, we examined whether (1) the children's list of namable things contained mostly living animate things and their surrogates, and (2) the adults' list contained not only living animate things and their surrogates, but also artefacts and many other things.
The data are shown in Tables 6 and 7 . Again, we tested these predictions in two ways. First, we compared the percentages of items on adults' and children's lists that fell into the categories of (1) living animate things and their surrogates, (2) artefacts, and (3) other things. As predicted, the children's list of namable things again contained almost exclusively category 1 items. These items accounted for 91% (32/35) of the list. The list contained no artefacts, and other things accounted for the remaining 9% (3/35) . In contrast, the adults' list was not dominated by category 1, which accounted for only 36% (21/59) of the items. Instead, the list contained a sizable percentage of items from the other categories: 19% artefacts (11/59), and 46% other things (27/59). In sum, children's and adults' lists were again structured very distinctively: the children's list was dominated by animate living things and their surrogates, whereas the adults' list contained a more diverse set of things.
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FIRST LANGUAGE VOLUME 24 ISSUE 1 cats (12), bears (9), people (8), rabbits (7), flowers (5), candy (3), dogs (6) , horses (6) , fish (5), butterflies (4), leaves (2) dinosaurs (4), snakes (4), bats (3), frogs (3), lions (3), whales (3), beavers (2), birds (2), chickens (2), cows (2), dolls (2), dragons (2), elephants (2), giraffes (2), mice (2), monkeys (2), owls (2), parrots (2), pigs (2), racoons (2), sharks (2), teddy bears (2), tigers (2), turtles (2) Second, we analysed the numbers of different group members contributing at least one item to each of the three categories, exactly as in Study 1. The results were consistent with those from the preceding comparisons. We found that 15/15 children and 15/15 adults contributed to the category of animate living things and their surrogates. In contrast, no children contributed to the category of artefacts, whereas 14/15 adults did, χ 2 (1, N = 30) = 26.25, p < 0.0001. Moreover, only 6/15 children contributed to the category of other things, whereas 13/15 adults did, another significant difference, χ 2 (1, N = 30) = 7.03, p = 0.008. These results confirmed the findings from our first comparisons: the children's list of namable things was more centred than that of the adults on living animate things and their surrogates.
As in Study 1, we noted three further facts about children's and adults' lists. First, the items mentioned on the lists were again predominantly basic-level count nouns (Rosch et al., 1976) . For example, when we focused on two categories (living animate things and their surrogates, and artefacts), we found that the children's list of namable things contained no superordinate-level count nouns, and the adults' list included only a few (animals, appliances, clothes, jewellery, toys). This finding offers further evidence of the importance (14), cats (13), animals cars (9), toys (8), boats (7), cities (6), countries (5), (9), birds (9), fish (9), horses buildings (6), airplanes (4), places (5), plants (5), (6), pets (6) , cows (5), dogs (4), appliances (3), blankets (3), parks (4), schools (4), hamsters (4), bugs (3), chickens clothing (3), computers (3), streets (4), books (3), (3), dolls (3), monkeys (3), houses (2), jewellery (2) planets (3), sports stuffed animals (3), bears (2) , teams (3), stars (3), dolphins (2), fictional characters TV programmes (3), (2), imaginary friends (2), churches (2), pigs (2), sheep (2) clubs/groups (2), drinks (2), flowers (2), food (2), lakes (2), organizations (2), paintings (2), rivers (2), school subjects (2), suns (2), theories (2), tornadoes (2), towns (2), trees (2) of the basic level in the way both children and adults think about objects in the world. Second, the living animate things mentioned by both groups were mostly toys, pets or other domesticated animals, although a number of wild animals also appeared on children's list (e.g., lions, raccoons), perhaps because animals of these kinds also appear in children's fiction. Finally, more than onethird of the items (37% or 13/35) in the children's namable things list also appeared in the adults' list. This percentage is lower than it was in Study 1 (58%), although the absolute number of common items was essentially the same. These items, which are bold in Tables 6 and 7 , included 12 living animates and their surrogates, and one other thing. This result again points to some degree of continuity between children's and adults' lists, although the structure of the lists was notably different.
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Non-namable things lists
As in Study 1, we examined whether (1) the children's list of non-namable things was heavily weighted with artefacts, and (2) the adults' list of nonnamable things contained a wider range of items. The data are given in Tables 8 and 9 . As predicted, the largest category of non-namable things on the children's list was that of artefacts. Children's list contained no living animates or their surrogates; instead, it contained 58% artefacts (19/33) and 42% other items (14/33). As in Study 1, and again somewhat unexpectedly, the adults' list of non-namable things was structured very similarly to children's. Their list also contained no living animates or their surrogates. Instead, it too contained a mix of artefacts (55% or 33/60) and other items (45% or 27/60), similar to that of children. These findings confirm the Study 1 discovery that children's and adults' lists of non-namable things were structured similarly: artefacts were the most common entities on both
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FIRST LANGUAGE VOLUME 24 ISSUE 1 (6) , mirrors (4), walls (4) , leaves (4), clouds (3), eggs (3), balls (3), windows (3), blankets candy (2), eyes (2), hair (2), (2), boxes (2), coats (2), doors (2) , letters (2), pictures (2), glasses (2), hairdryers (2), hats (2), pumpkins (2), rainbows (2), lights (2) , pencils (2), sunglasses rocks (2), snowflakes (2), suns ) (2), tables (2), towels (2), toys (2), (2), teeth (2 trains (2) lists, and neither list contained any living animates or their surrogates. Unlike the Study 1 lists, however, the Study 2 lists contained a larger percentage of other things.
As we did with the namable things lists, we next analysed the nonnamable lists in a way that took account of the number of different participants who gave at least one example from each of the three categories. The results revealed a pattern consistent with the preceding findings. We found that 0/15 children and 0/15 adults contributed to the category of animates and animate surrogates, and so we computed no statistic. In contrast, 11/15 children and 14/15 adults contributed to the category of artefacts, a non-significant difference by χ 2 test. Moreover, 12/15 children supplied items for the other things category, whereas 13/15 adults did so, another non-significant difference. These results are consistent with the preceding comparisons. Both children's and adults' lists were structured similarly, being heavily weighted with artefacts and other items.
As in Study 1, two other features of children's and adults' non-namable lists merit comment. First, both children's and adults' lists again contained mostly basic-level count nouns (Rosch et al., 1976) . Focusing on living animates and their surrogates and artefacts, we found that the children's list contained only one superordinate-level count noun (toys). Adults' lists included only a few superordinates (appliances, clothing, furniture, jewellery, tools) . This finding provides further evidence of the primacy of the basic level in children's and D. GEOFFREY HALL ET AL.: PROPER NAMABLE THINGS Table 9 Study 2: things listed as non-namable by two or more adults (N = 15)
Living animates Artefacts
Other things and their surrogates clothing (9), tables (8), chairs (6) , food (7), water (6), body parts (4), TVs (6), carpets (5), desks (5), doors books (4), hair (4), clouds (3), (5), houses (5), jewellery (5), paper dreams (3), numbers (3), rain (3), (5), pens (4), pencils (4), shelves (4), sky (3), air (2), boxes (2), fire (2), bags (3), furniture (3), lights (3), fruit (2), pictures (2), places (2), shoes (3), walls (3), windows (3), roads (2), rocks (2), schools (2), appliances (2), balloons (2), beds (2), space (2), sports equipment (2), ceilings (2), computers (2), cups (2), suns (2) , thoughts (2), trees (2), floors (2), fridges (2), rooms (2), sofas weather (2), wind (2), wires (2) (2), stationery (2), stoves (2), tools (2), VCRs (2) adults' construal of entities in the world. Second, there was an overlap between children's and adults' non-namable things lists, as there was in the case of their namable things lists: 36% (12/33) of the items on children's nonnamable list also turned up on adults' list. This percentage is again lower than that in Study 1 (80% or 16/20) , although the absolute number of overlapping items differed by only four. The common items, in bold in Tables 8 and 9 , included seven artefacts and five other things. The overlap again indicates some degree of similarity between children's and adults' lists, although there was still an appreciable difference.
Comparisons between namable and non-namable things lists
As in Study 1, for both children and adults, lists of namable and non-namable things were largely non-overlapping. Again, however, several items did appear on both adults' lists or both children's lists. We first considered adults' lists of namable and non-namable things. We found five artefacts (appliances, clothing, computers, houses, jewellery) and six other things (books, food, places, schools, suns, trees) that appeared on both lists. In all but one of these cases (clothing), no adult had the same item on both his/her namable list and also his/her non-namable list. Thus, the appearance of these items on both namable and non-namable lists generally reflected differences between adults in terms of how they construed the items. As in Study 1, we have two ideas about why these particular items might have turned up on both lists. First, some adults may have listed certain items as proper namable because they do receive an associated brand name, whereas other adults may have listed the same items as non-namable because they do not receive a personal name (appliances, clothing, computers, jewellery, food) . In fact, one adult who listed 'clothing' on both her namable and her non-namable lists provided support for this interpretation. When she listed 'clothing' on her namable list, she prefaced it with 'brands of'. However, when she listed it on her non-namable list, she prefaced it with 'basic types of'. Similarly, the item 'book' may have been listed as namable by some who thought of it as an abstract literary work but as nonnamable by others who construed it as a physical object. Second, for other items, adults may have been thinking about a personal name, but simply disagreed over whether the item merited one (houses, places, schools, suns, trees).
Only one item (candy) appeared on children's lists of namable and nonnamable things. We suggest that some children may have been thinking of certain candy brands when they listed it as namable whereas others may have been thinking of individual pieces when they listed it as non-namable.
Summary of listing task
As in Study 1, and consistent with the claim of Macnamara (1982 Macnamara ( , 1986 , children tended to list animate living things and their surrogates as deserving a proper name, and tended not to mention human artefacts or other things as being so worthy. In contrast, adults again tended to judge all the preceding types of things to merit a proper name. Again, children and adults showed similar beliefs about what things are non-namable. Both groups tended to list human artefacts and other things as being unworthy of a proper name, and neither group mentioned a single living animate or surrogate as being an unsuitable recipient of a proper name.
Comparison between the listing tasks of Study 1 and Study 2
Recall that the primary rationale for conducting Study 2 was to understand why, in Study 1, many adults but no children listed 'people' as a namable thing. In Study 2, we made two changes to the method of Study 1: we used 'dogs' rather than 'people' as a standard, and we avoided explicitly prompting children about this item. The results provided support for a methodological explanation for the difference observed in Study 1. First, in Study 2 both 5-yearolds and adults clearly saw 'people' as namable: 'people' was a highly common response for both children (8/15, third most common item) and adults (14/15, most common item). Thus, neither children nor adults were unwilling to list people as namable. Second, in Study 2 both children (6/15) and adults (4/15) occasionally mentioned the new standard 'dogs' in their lists. Thus, when children's prompts eliminated any explicit reminder about the standard, both children and adults were willing to include it in their lists.
It is important to note that the occasional tendency to mention the standard does not imply an inability to follow task instructions. For example, compare the number of mentions of 'dogs' to the number of mentions of the comparable item 'cats' in the two studies. In Study 1, when 'people' was the standard, mentions of 'dogs' and 'cats' were similar in number (for children, 8/15 and 8/15, respectively; for adults, 7/15 and 6/15, respectively). However, in Study 2, when 'dogs' was the standard, there were many fewer mentions of 'dogs' relative to 'cats' (for children, 6/15 and 12/15; for adults, 4/15 and 13/15). Thus we suggest that the appearance of the standard on some children's and adults' namable lists does not imply an inability to follow task instructions but rather stems from the fact that some participants lost track of the standard or simply decided to repeat it in generating their sometimes-lengthy lists.
In other respects, the results of Study 1 and Study 2 were in general agreement. In both studies, children's namable things lists were dominated by living animates and their surrogates, whereas adults' lists were broader in extent. In both studies, children's and adults' non-namable things lists were heavily laden with artefacts, though the Study 2 lists contained a larger percentage of other things than those of Study 1. These observations are supported by consideration of the combined results of the listing tasks from the two studies. In creating these combined lists, we included all items that appeared on each of the four lists in both studies. Children's combined namable things list contained 10 living animates and their surrogates, and nothing else. In contrast, adults' combined namable things list contained 14 living animates and their surrogates, 9 artefacts and 21 other things. Children's combined non-namable things list contained 9 artefacts and nothing else; adults' combined non-namable combined list contained 19 artefacts and 5 other things.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In two studies, 5-year-olds and adults generated lists of things that they believed could, and could not, receive proper names. In Study 1 they then offered explanations for why certain things could receive proper names. Most children listed living animates and their surrogates (like dolls, stuffed animals and puppets) as deserving of reference by a proper name, whereas few considered human artefacts or other things (such as companies, events, institutions, media products and places) to be so worthy. In contrast, most adults judged all the preceding kinds of things to merit reference by a proper name. Both children's and adults' lists of non-namable objects were heavily filled with artefacts, and to a lesser degree with other things. These results are consistent with previous proposals in the literature that: (1) for children, proper namable things are living animates and their surrogates (e.g., puppets, stuffed animals, dolls); see, for example, Macnamara, 1982 Macnamara, , 1986 and (2) for adults, the set of namable things is much broader and not so heavily focused on living animates and their surrogates, e.g., Valentine et al. 1996 . Despite significant differences in the composition of their lists of namable things, adults and children offered remarkably similar explanations for why things can receive proper names. The majority of adults and children stated that certain things receive proper names in order to be identified as individuals in their own right or to be distinguished from other things. This finding supports Macnamara's (1982 Macnamara's ( , 1986 claim that people attribute a proper name to something if it is seen to be deserving of reference as an individual in its own right. Only one other type of explanation was relatively common in participants' responses: the need to interact with something socially or to mark affection for it. No other type of explanation, including the fact that something is animate or has animate properties (or human properties), was common in children's and adults' answers. These findings suggest that both adults and 5-year-olds possess a shared underlying conception of what makes something deserve reference by a proper name, and that the most important reason, for both groups, relates to the need for something to be treated as an individual in its own right.
The pattern of results we observed in the two tasks, listing and explaining, indicates that the salient differences between children and adults in the composition of the namable things lists do not stem from fundamentally different notions of why certain things merit reference by a proper name. This leaves the question of why children's lists were so heavily weighted with living animates and their surrogates, and rarely included human artefacts or other things. Macnamara's (1982 Macnamara's ( , 1986 answer to this question was that, in the experience of young children, the things that receive proper names are mostly animates and their surrogates. Children rarely hear names for many of the things to which adults often give proper names, such as many kinds of human artefacts (e.g., cars, boats). In addition, many children may not know much about many of the other kinds of things to which adults ascribe proper names, such as cities, planets and hurricanes; thus, it should be unsurprising that they do not list them as namable (or non-namable). The difference between the composition of adults' and children's lists, on this view, reflects children's lack of knowledge that certain kinds of things can receive names, or their unfamiliarity with certain kinds of things. This view also suggests that children should have no difficulty in coming to see other types of entities, like artefacts, as deserving reference by a proper name, provided that the entities are made to be seen as important as individuals in their own right. Consistent with this view, children commonly encounter proper names for anthropomorphized artefacts (e.g., 'Thomas' the Tank Engine) in books, films and television shows. In addition, Sorrentino (2002) has obtained evidence that preschoolers will learn a proper name for an artefact if its physical properties and/or mental states are explicitly pointed out.
In sum, our findings meet the two main goals that motivated this research, making two contributions to the study of language development. First, the results establish a set of norms (for North American English) about the scope and coherence of 5-year-olds' and adults' concept of a proper namable entity. Given the universality of proper names in the world's languages and cultures (e.g., Greenberg, 1963) , our results may be used to anchor future studies of cross-linguistic and cross-cultural differences in proper naming practices (e.g., Alford, 1987) , as well as to shed light on disruptions in proper naming brought about by individual language breakdown (e.g., Warrington & McCarthy, 1987) .
Second, the results place constraints on an account of how children learn to identify proper names in speech, an accomplishment that children acquiring English appear to make by the time they are about two years old (e.g., Hall et al., 2001; Katz et al., 1974) . We discovered that 5-year-olds' beliefs about what is namable were different from those of adults, being largely restricted to living animates and their surrogates. However, 5-year-olds resembled adults in attributing proper names according to whether an object is in need of being individuated or distinguished, i.e., treated as important in its own right. Of course, 5-year-olds are past the point of learning their first proper names. Yet children of this age are still heavily engaged in the task of learning words (Anglin, 1993) , and so our data are highly relevant to the issue of how knowledge of proper names emerges. Specifically, the results indicate that a significant broadening of the scope of children's list of proper namable things does not appear to occur until after the age of five, but that an adult-like rationale for attributing proper names is already in use by that age. Our results are consistent with the possibility that this rationale underpins children's initial identification of these expressions in parental speech (cf. Macnamara, 1982 Macnamara, , 1986 . These findings thus open the way for further work to explore the evolution of the concept of a namable thing, as well as the scope and coherence of this concept in children on the cusp of learning language.
